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Using ethnographic data on the country programme Belarus-Ukraine-Moldova 
(BUM) of Civic Education Project (CEP), an international non-governmental 
organisation, as an example, this paper seeks to challenge an assumption about the 
relationship between NGOs and the development of imperialism that their 
relationship is simple and direct. Contrary to this assumption, the evidence shows 
that the relationship between CEP and imperialism is neither simple nor direct in 
that CEP practices could be consistent with, contradictory to, or irrelevant to 
imperialism. I conclude that the development of imperialism does not necessarily 
follow a consistent logic that leads to some definite or irresistible outcomes but 
involves a measure of contingency or indeterminacy. 
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Despite its diverse meanings, it is commonly agreed that globalisation is a 
process involving the flows of capital, commodities, industries, information 
and technology, and people across borders (cf. Urry 2000). Globalisation 
could be considered a rather popular topic in the 1990s (e.g. Lindberg and 
Sverrisson 1997). One main focus of discussion is on how to understand and 
theorise the relationship between the so-called First World (or the developed 
countries) and the so-called Third World (or the developing countries). 
Marxist theories and concepts are of great relevance here, especially in 
theorising the relationship among the concepts of ‘globalisation’, 
‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’. Globalisation provides not simply an 
interface between the First World and the Third World but, as some argue, 
could be seen as a context for imperialism exhibited in the forms of 
economic, political, and cultural dominations of the First World over the 
Third World (cf. Bruff 2005; Hamm and Smandych 2005). Globalisation is 
not a new phenomenon. It began in the fifteen century (e.g. Robertson 1992). 
From then on until the second half of the twentieth century, globalisation 
coincided with colonisation: the growth of First-World (mainly European) 
empires and the inter-imperialist rivalry of these military powers for direct 
territorial and political control in the Third World (mainly Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia) (cf. Mehmet 1999). The end of colonisation partly 
overlapped the beginning of neo-liberal capitalism. In making use of the 
insights offered by Marxists in taking globalisation as a context, colonialism 
and neo-liberal capitalism could be seen as two forms of imperialism (cf. 
Lenin 1964; Owen and Sutcliffe 1972).  
In the era of colonisation, what the European powers had in common was 
their use of military force to create a system of dependency and exploitation 
connecting themselves (the colonisers) and their subjects (the colonised) so 
as to secure conditions meeting their need for territorial expansion and 
political dominance. In applying a Marxist framework to understand 
colonisation, there are two conflicting views on the relationship between the 
development of colonisation and that of capitalism (cf. Szymanski 1981). 
First, colonisation was ultimately driven by political or economic motives 
and thus a result of the development of capitalism. Second, colonisation was 
driven by all kinds of motives and capitalism was just a side-product of the 
development of colonisation. It remained debatable whether colonisation 
was a cause or a result of the development of capitalism. But, economic 
motives were undoubtedly involved in a colonial pursuit and colonisation 
could be seen as playing a part in the development of capitalism. Colonial 
pursuits of nation-states in the Third World made it possible for capitalists 
back home to realise their desire for economic expansion (e.g. Brewer 1980). 
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On the side of distribution, capitalists had an insatiable need for finding 
markets to sell their products so as to generate greater revenues; the Third 
World then provided capitalists with new markets for their products and 
new investment opportunities: they could export their products to the Third 
World or even make investments there. On the side of production, capitalists 
had a constant need for minimising the cost; the Third World then provided 
capitalists with cheaper resources for production: they could import cheaper 
raw materials and labour from the Third World or simply move there to 
carry out some stages of production. The Third World somehow benefited 
from the economic dominations of the First World: while exploiting the 
cheap labour in the Third World, capitalists simultaneously promoted the 
development of the Third World through providing people there with job 
opportunities. Nevertheless, the benefits of the First World and the Third 
World in these exchanges are deeply unequal (cf. Evans 2000). In particular, 
the Third World can actually be seen as being integrated within a world 
system through simultaneous marginalisation: what makes the development 
of the First World possible is precisely the underdevelopment of the Third 
World (cf. Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1988). Economic dominance of the First 
World continued despite the era of colonisation having come to a close; one 
form of its manifestation was the promotion of neo-liberal capitalism over 
the last century. In promoting neo-liberal capitalism, trans-national 
capitalists in the First World together with such international organisations 
as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organisation could be viewed as working hand in hand to exploit jointly the 
Third World (e.g. Hobsbawm 1994; cf. Stiglitz 2002; Harvey 2003; Passavant 
and Dean 2004). And in this way neo-liberal capitalism could be seen as a 
new form of imperialism. At first glance, this form of imperialism seems less 
state-centric vis-à-vis colonisation. Nevertheless, nation-states still play a 
role in this movement towards neo-liberal polices: the movement would not 
have happened simply out of global economic forces but it has somehow 
been imposed by nation-states with their particular interests and ideologies 
(e.g. Fulcher 2000). Yet neo-liberal capitalism is still different from 
colonisation in two ways. The first is the primary form of domination. 
Colonisation is a competition among imperial nation-states primarily for 
military domination and territorial control, whereas neo-liberal capitalism 
could mean a co-operation of imperialist powers primarily for joint 
economic domination or systematic global domination of capitalism (cf. 
Hardt and Negri 2000; Pieterse 2004). The second is the nature of 
domination. Colonisation is a form of direct domination with responsibility: 
in exploiting the colonised and making them dependent on themselves, the 
colonisers are responsible for the colonised. In contrast, neo-liberal 
capitalism could be seen as a form of indirect domination without 
responsibility: in securing conditions for expansion and domination, 
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imperialists seek to achieve not direct military control, which is its last 
resort, but indirect economic, political, cultural, and ideological control (cf. 
Toye 1993; Putzel 2005).  
Admittedly, a Marxist approach provides a useful theoretical framework 
and some insightful concepts for scholars to make sense of the ever-
changing relationship between the First World and the Third World. 
However, many issues remain unsettled. Scholars continue to debate over 
many issues revolving around the relationship between the development of 
imperialism and that of capitalism, such as the ultimate motives behind 
imperialism, and the relationship between the nation-state and capitalists in 
the development of imperialism. Despite their disagreements, scholars seem 
to share the same desire of identifying the logic of imperialism holding an 
assumption that there exists the logic of imperialism, however defined, that 
co-ordinates smoothly a set of actors through a number of mechanisms 
leading to some definite outcomes that cannot be resisted or counteracted in 
any way. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are seen as one of these 
actors. Over the last three decades, NGOs have mushroomed in the Third 
World (e.g. Gudynas 1997). The emergence of NGOs could be traced back to 
the 1970s in Latin America: along with the promotion of liberalisation, 
privatisation, and deregulation, NGOs were set up there to organise 
grassroots people to fight poverty and foreign exploitation (cf. Edwards and 
Hulme 1996; Clarke 1998). Applying a Marxist framework to theorise the 
relationship between NGOs and the logic of imperialism, three views could 
be distinguished. First, NGOs work against this logic. This view is related to 
the successes and potentials reported for NGOs vis-à-vis the nation-state in 
social, economic, and democratic development in the Third World. Given 
their successes and potentials, NGOs are seen as a progressive force working 
with Third-World people to counteract the exploitation and influence of 
First-World capitalists and imperialists. However, some evidence indicates 
that instead of getting people out of poverty in the Third World, NGOs turn 
them even poorer (e.g. Petras 1997; cf. Pearce 1997). This leads to the second 
view: NGOs are doomed to fail and their failure is part of the logic of 
imperialism. Whether NGOs are doomed to fail is beyond the scope of this 
paper and this view remains open to further empirical scrutiny. But this 
view is very close to the third view: NGOs work for the logic of imperialism. 
NGOs, as with missionaries or charity institutions in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, are working side by side with First-World nation-states 
and capitalists: in securing the latter’s expansion and domination in the 
Third World, NGOs are exerting ideological control in the Third World 
through imposing on them First-World values and attitudes (cf. Mercer 
2002). In other words, NGOs play the part of wrapping up imperialism 
today in humanitarian clothes and the rescue of the oppressed masses 
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through the promotion of democracy and human rights (e.g. Mabee 2004; 
Prasch 2005).  
 
In fact, NGO is an umbrella term embracing a wide range of organisations 
and their natures could be vastly different (cf. Hilhorst 2003). This could 
partly explain why three competing views on NGOs and imperialism are 
put forward. Despite their differences, what these views have in common is 
their same underlying assumption about NGOs that they play a definite role 
in the development of imperialism. What this assumption implies is that the 
relationship between NGOs and the logic of imperialism is simple and 
direct. The elements of contradiction, contingency, and indeterminacy which 
could play significant roles in the development of imperialism seem under-
emphasised, if not ignored completely (cf. Mattausch 2003). It remains 
uncertain whether the logic exists in prescribing the development of 
imperialism. But, this paper seeks to challenge this assumption about the 
relationship between NGOs and the development of imperialism by 
referring to some practices of an NGO: the country programme Belarus-
Ukraine-Moldova (BUM) of Civic Education Project (CEP). It seeks to 
illustrate the relationship between NGOs and the development of 
imperialism is neither simple nor direct; rather, it could be ambiguous and 
contradictory. This illustration not only casts doubts into the view that the 
development of imperialism follows a complete and consistent logic that 
leads to some definite outcomes, but also leads me to conclude that this 
logic, even if it exists, could be partial and contradictory and the 
development of imperialism involves a measure of contingency.  
Background and Methods 
 
CEP (see http://www.civiceducationproject.org), mainly funded by the 
Open Society Institute, was an international NGO initiated by a few people 
in 1990 as a project to bring a handful of westerners to teach in 
Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic), then became an international 
network running a number of country programmes in two dozen countries 
within a decade, and finally ceased to exist but was merged with the Higher 
Education Support Program in 2004. During the fourteen years of existence, 
CEP had made its ultimate goal increasingly clear: that was, in defending 
civil society CEP strove to promote democracy in Central European and 
former-Soviet countries through the transformation of their systems of 
higher education. To this end, CEP devised two major components for each 
country programme: a local faculty fellowship programme (LFFP) and a 
visiting faculty fellowship programme (VFFP). Each country programme 
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was run by one director together with a number of administrative staff co-
ordinating activities with local fellows (LFs) and visiting fellows (VFs).  
 
According to assessments by CEP (Education for the Transition: Part I 1997), 
the systems of higher education across the region were characterised as 
centralised state-planned and they faced such problems as the ageing of 
lecturers, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, a lack of resources, limited 
academic autonomy, and ineffective teaching. In particular, in teaching 
social science subjects, most local lecturers taught with a so-called Soviet-
style: they just read out the same lecture notes full of outdated and 
ideologically loaded material year after year but did not expect to engage 
students in dialogues in classes. Teaching at a local higher education 
institution was not an attractive job, especially to young people, because the 
pay was low (no more than US$60 per month for a full-time position) with a 
heavy teaching load (ranging from 800 to 1000 hours a year for a full-time 
position). CEP assumed that the essence of the problem was a brain drain; 
LFFP was designed to combat this. CEP sought to recruit reform-minded 
young prospective committed local academics who had significant western 
educational experience. CEP then provided LFs, who had secured a full-time 
position in a local university, with support of two major kinds. The first was 
tangible: an annual stipend and allowances for buying books or making 
photocopies or using the Internet. With a CEP stipend, LFs did not need to 
take more than one full-time teaching position in order to make ends meet 
and thus had more time for teaching preparation; and with CEP allowances, 
they could afford to prepare notes and reading material for students. The 
second kind of support was intangible: information about scholarships, 
conferences, or workshops, and training of various kinds, usually related to 
teaching. VFFP was designed to play a supplementary part. CEP brought in 
well-established academics from the West and allocated them to teach for 
free in a local university for a year or two so that VFs could serve as resource 
persons providing professional assistance for LFs as well as other local 
lecturers. With professional support from CEP, LFs could introduce new 
courses and use new teaching techniques to make classes more interesting 
and stimulating and to enable students to think critically. In short, CEP 
expected LFs to become different local lecturers and also expected them to 
work closely with VFs to organise CEP events for local lecturers. The idea of 
CEP was to nurture LFs to become new generations of critically-minded 
social scientists, and then to enable them to establish their careers in local 
academia; they in turn nurtured their students and set an example for their 
local colleagues so that their students and colleagues would also become 
critically-minded individuals. It was hoped that one day when the number 
of critically-minded individuals got to the level of a critical mass, they would 
organise themselves to spread the ideas of civil society and democracy and 
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thus to bring changes to their countries from bottom-up, and this, in turn, 
would eventually lead to top-down changes; consequently, both bottom-up 
and top-down effects would transform these countries and make the 
realisation of democracy there possible (cf. Fisher 1998). 
 
 
Material of this paper is drawn from two sources. The first is CEP 
documents. This includes some CEP publications and CEP internal 
documents such as profiles of LFs, evaluations of retreats, and country 
programmes’ strategic plans. The most important CEP internal document 
that I heavily rely on is Kotkin Report (2001). It is a comprehensive internal 
evaluation of CEP by an independent external assessor Stephen Kotkin 
conducted in 2000. The second source is ethnographic data from my first-
hand experience as a VF from 2002 to 2004 working for CEP-BUM. This 
includes my observation in some CEP events, involvement in evaluating a 
CEP project, involvement in the selection process of LFs in 2003 and 2004, 
experiences of organising and participating in CEP events, and interviews of 
various kinds (casual conversations, serious discussions, and taped 
interviews) with some CEP fellows and administrative staff. Material 
presented below is my own interpretation of these CEP documents and my 
own evaluation of CEP-BUM. I do not claim that mine is the only 
interpretation or that my experience is representative of other fellows. 
Neither do I seek to provide a comprehensive evaluation of CEP (or CEP-
BUM) in relation to its strategies for educational reforms in the region. 
Rather, referring to some practices found in CEP-BUM, I seek to use CEP as 
an NGO to challenge the assumption about the relationship between NGOs 
and the development of imperialism. 




As was stated in its mission, CEP sought to promote democracy and civil 
society across the region through reforming the system of higher education 
there; its strategies were nurturing critically-minded social scientists and 
individuals in the region. This mission immediately gives rise to different 
interpretations and this thus poses a challenge to the view that the 
relationship between NGOs and imperialism is simple and direct. The 
relationship between CEP and imperialism could be considered rather 
ambiguous. One could well argue that CEP itself was imperialistic or was at 
least a catalyst of imperialism. Imposing the western ideals of democracy, 
civil society, and critical thinking on the region, CEP could be considered to 
be exerting ideological domination over locals. Alternatively, these ideals 
could be interpreted in such a way that they go hand in hand with free trade 
and neo-liberalism opposing state intervention. In this sense, CEP could be 
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viewed as serving as an ideological control for imperialism in that CEP was 
preparing individuals to become critical of a state-centralised planned 
system but receptive to western thinking or ideas of free market and 
capitalism. In spreading the ideologies that supported free trade and 
capitalism, CEP was no different from nurturing local collaborators who 
could speak the same language (of free market) and think on the same 
wavelength as First-World capitalists. What CEP did could therefore be 
interpreted as preparing the region for the First-World’s future dominations. 
However, one could counter-argue that taking an academic approach to 
advocate democracy and civil society through critical thinking, CEP was 
actually a gravedigger of imperialism, if not completely self-undermining. In 
advocating critical thinking, CEP could be viewed as serving on an 
ideological front to guard against the invasion of imperialism in that CEP 
was enabling individuals to hold a critical view not only on state-centralised 
planned system but also on the ideas of free market and capitalism. In 
fostering critical thinking, CEP was actually nurturing local critics who 
would question basically everything: not only neo-liberalism but also CEP 
practices and even the idea of critical thinking itself. What CEP did could 
thus be viewed as preparing the region to resist the First World’s future 
invasions. In sum, CEP’s mission alone did not tell us a definite relationship 
between CEP and imperialism: it was equally plausible to interpret CEP as 
being imperialistic or self-undermining, as a catalyst or a gravedigger of 
imperialism. To realise its mission, CEP had two major strategies, namely, 
LFFP and VFFP. In other words, it was absolutely crucial for CEP to 
recruiting the ‘right’ fellows. Now let us turn to the recruitment of VFs and 





In looking for VFs, CEP aimed to bring in well-established academics from 
the West to stay in the region for a year or two so as to serve as resource 
persons for LFs and local academics. In practice CEP was rather flexible: it 
would also accept retired professors (who finished their academic careers) or 
prospective academics (who were about to begin theirs). Indeed, three-
fourths of VFs were not well-established academics but fell into two 
categories (Kotkin Report 2001: 41): the elderly (retired professors) or the 
young (those having a master’s degree or working towards a PhD or having 
recently received a PhD). This did not necessarily mean that these VFs were 
not serious about their academic works. But this suggested that most VFs 
were not ideal resource persons: the elderly lacked the enthusiasm whereas 
the young lacked the experience. What was problematic was that some VFs 
were simply professionally incapable, as indicated in the following 
quotation. 
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 ‘For some reasons, CEP didn’t seem able to attract well-
established academics. What was worse, in the past a few VFs 





Against CEP’s wishes, CEP failed to recruit VFs who could serve as resource 
persons. This certainly could be explained in a commonsensical way: as with 
any recruitment, CEP’s recruitment could fail by chance or by mistake. But 
this could be due to CEP’s administrative concern. As expressed by some 
administrative staff, CEP gave priority to the characteristics of candidates 
rather than their academic profiles for the sake of smooth administration. 
Choosing VFs who were adaptive and could thus live independently in the 
region, CEP administrators could avoid potential troubles of handling VFs’ 
complaints about their practical difficulties there. In addition, CEP actually 
realised that chances were slim that the package of VFFP – an annual stipend 
of US$6700-7700 with local housing and a number of allowances – could 
attract academics who would uproot their established career in the West but 
join CEP for a year or two. Then why did CEP not make this package more 
attractive? Some administrative staff indicated that with its budget limit, this 
unattractive package was already the best that CEP could offer. Given a 
limited budget that did not attract well-established academics but the 
professionally incapable in some cases, then why did CEP not drop VFFP 
altogether? From my casual chatting with many VFs, I gathered that local 
universities actually took VFs as trophies that would gain them status in 
local academia. So, regardless of whether CEP could recruit the ‘right’ VFs, 
VFFP might serve two functions for CEP. First, VFFP might give CEP a 
better bargaining position to solicit the cooperation of local universities in 
order to get done what CEP wanted to in the region. Second, VFFP might 
serve as an attractive component for CEP as an NGO to appeal to its 
potential western donors for further funding. In other words, this 
discrepancy between its stated desire of recruiting VFs who were qualified 
as resource persons and its failure to do so was not purely out of chance or 
mistake but could be out of CEP’s strategic concern.  
In looking for LFs, CEP sought to recruit reform-minded and committed 
prospective local academics. To this end, CEP set a criterion that applicants 
should have significant western educational experience. In most cases, this 
selection criterion meant an applicant having a master’s degree from the 
West. But, in practice CEP was rather flexible in operationalising ‘significant 
                                                          
*  In order to keep my informants unidentifiable, I would not indicate whether the 
interview was formal or not (taped or not), or state their identifiable attributes 
such as their post, country of origin, and gender.  
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educational experience’ and ‘the West’. ‘Significant educational experience’ 
could mean doing a non-degree exchange programme for three months, 
while ‘the West’ could mean non-Eastern countries such as Hungary. The 
profile of LFs (a CEP internal document) showed that about two-thirds of 
LFs had recently received a western master’s degree in some professions but 
most of the rest had just joined some non-degree exchange programmes 
staying in Britain, the USA, or Hungary for no more than one year. While 
this profile of LFs did not tell us whether LFs were prospective academics, it 
definitely told us that most of LFs were prospective professionals. Choosing 
to go abroad and to expose oneself to a new culture might indicate that this 
individual was somehow different from an average person in terms of 
language skills, ambition, and openness to new ideas. However, it was 
unclear how this criterion could indicate in any way that this person was 
reform-minded and committed to local academia. Besides, given the 
economic hardship in the region, a LFFP fellowship with an annual stipend 
of US$3000 – which was more than four times higher than a local full-time 
teaching position – was a very attractive alternative to many prospective 
LFs. In this sense, apart from committed prospective local academics, CEP 
might well recruit people who were only concerned about a CEP stipend 
and would leave local academia when a better opportunity came up. If this 
selection criterion might not be so effective in recruiting the ‘right’ LFs, why 
did CEP not opt for more effective ones? As was shared by some 
administrative staff, it was difficult or even costly to set up more 
complicated procedures in order to assess applicants’ academic commitment 
whereas this current criterion was relatively easy to administer. But I 
suspected that using this criterion was also adopted out of CEP’s strategic 
concern. This criterion denotes a sense of superiority of the West and CEP 
perhaps found it appealing to its potential western donors. In sum, CEP’s 
recruitment of VFs and LFs made the relationship between CEP and the 
development of imperialism more ambiguous. But, even if CEP was 
ineffective in recruiting the ‘right’ fellows, it did not immediately lead to a 
conclusion that the recruited CEP fellows were unable to do what were 
expected of them. Nor did it tell us what VFs and LFs did would be working 







While many VFs did not serve as resource persons, they did the teaching (as 
CEP required VFs to teach at least two courses a semester). But, the truth 
was that it was simply impossible for VFs to teach effectively largely because 
of language barriers (Kotkin Report 2001: 124). Most VFs were unable to 
teach in a local language. While nearly all VFs were teaching in English, only 
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a very small number of local students were able to understand English well. 
Some administrative staff expressed that it was a longstanding problem for 
CEP to gather enough English-speaking students for VFs. Even if there were 
enough students, VFs still needed to simplify their courses in that the 
courses were doomed to be very basic. In other words, VFs simply could not 
promote such western ideals as democracy, civil society, and critical 
thinking, however interpreted, to their students through teaching. This 
implied that VFs’ teaching was actually irrelevant to imperialism. Not 
having enough students for their courses, some VFs were then asked to 
teach local students English. It could be interpreted as a kind of flexibility: 
CEP took advantage of what these VFs could offer. But it did not seem to 
make sense to bring expensive non-experts English-teachers to teach 
English; this somehow lent support to my view that despite its 
ineffectiveness, CEP kept VFFP out of a strategic concern. While the genuine 
intention of CEP keeping VFFP remained unclear, the act of asking VFs to 
teach English itself could be interpreted as CEP serving as more of a catalyst 
than of a gravedigger of imperialism: teaching students a language for 
international trade.  
Whereas VFFP played a supplementary role, LFFP was crucial to realising 
CEP’s set goal. To reiterate, CEP expected LFs to become different local 
lecturers: to introduce new courses, to use new teaching techniques, and to 
enable students to think critically. However, CEP seemed to underestimate 
the obstacles that LFs would encounter. There are centralised national 
standards set by the Ministry of Education in each country (cf. Education for 
the Transition Part III 1997). In practice, lecturers could perhaps risk 
ignoring the national standards and did whatever they wanted in classes. 
But, most LFs were the youngest faculty members, meaning that they 
usually had no choice but teach the subjects that they were assigned to teach. 
Given the strict demand that local lecturers had to comply with the 
centralised national standards, and that stiff resistance to anything new in 
local departments was the rule rather than an exception, LFs were simply 
not in a position to introduce officially any new courses or to introduce 
openly new teaching techniques.  
 
 
In addition, CEP also seemed to underestimate the load of one full-time 
teaching position: 800-1000 hours a year. It required teaching more than 20 
hours a week (if there were 17 teaching weeks a semester and two semesters 
an academic year). And a typical class size for LFs was more than 100 
students. Then, understandably, LFs might not have enough time to do the 
teaching preparation for classes, let alone for making classes interactive by 
CEP standards (cf. Education for the Transition Part II 1997), as articulated 
in the following quotation:  
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‘Those who stay in (their home) country often revert to multiple 
teaching jobs after CEP stipend runs out, losing their ability to do 
Western-style active learning. And even before their stipend runs 
out, many LFs have too many students in classes to teach 
effectively with (inter)active methods and attention to individual 
students.’ (quoted in Kotkin Report 2001: 48) 
What this quotation also revealed was that against CEP’s expectations, some 
LFs, with CEP stipends, still took up more than one full-time teaching 
position. That was largely because some LFs felt insecure about economic 
situations in their home countries (Kotkin Report 2001: 48-50). Overwhelmed 
by such a heavy teaching load, LFs simply had no time to keep up with the 
latest literature, let alone to conduct their own research. Even if LFs used 
new teaching techniques by CEP standards, teaching without content or 
without backing it up with research was perhaps not so simulating vis-à-vis 
courses offered by local academics. In other words, contrary to CEP’s 
expectation, LFs’ teaching turned out to be not so different from a Soviet-
style teaching that CEP had been campaigning against. The relationship 
between LF’s teaching and imperialism could then be interpreted in two 
ways. First, if LFs’ teaching, as with VFs’ teaching, was unable to promote 
the western ideals, it could be considered irrelevant to imperialism. Second, 
if LFs’ teaching was similar to a Soviet-style teaching and thus was 
supposed to be incompatible with capitalism or western ideals, it could be 
seen as ambivalent to imperialism: if LFs’ teaching was taken as 
incompatible with capitalism, then it could be seen as working against 
imperialism; but if it was taken as incompatible with such western ideals as 
being critical about capitalism, then it could be viewed as working for 
imperialism. 
 
Organising CEP events 
As well as teaching, CEP encouraged LFs and VFs to work closely to 
organise CEP events for local lecturers so as to bring in elements from the 
West to local academia. These events were usually one-off four-to-five day 
teacher training workshops or academic events (such as seminars and 
conferences) organised for usually twenty-five local participants. Most often, 
LFs – who spoke a local language and were more familiar with local logistics 
– served as organisers or coordinators whereas VFs were trainers; but there 
were some cases where VFs organised a CEP event and LFs were trainers.  
 
 51 
Given the small number of participants in each CEP event, even if every CEP 
event could successfully achieve its goal each time, one might still doubt the 
impact of CEP events on the region. But this was not critical: it certainly took 
time for CEP to have its impact felt in the region. From my experiences of 
organising and participating in CEP events, what was critical was the 
quality of CEP events and potential local resistance. To reiterate, most VFs 
and LFs were inexperienced teachers or novel academics in that they were 
not particularly knowledgeable about teaching or their disciplines. Surely, 
both VFs and LFs could still make contributions; local academics might 
benefit from their ‘new’ perspectives. But this did cast doubt into the quality 
of CEP events in which VFs and LFs were trainers. One might assume that 
being cut off from the outside world and lacking resources to organise 
academic events for themselves, local academics would find CEP events 
beneficial: they could be exposed to something new. It was true in some 
cases. But in other cases, participants, despite their agreement to join these 
events, were resistant to what was discussed there. This passive-
aggressiveness may seem puzzling but could actually be explained in part 
by the context against which CEP events took place. Given the cold-war 
legacy, it was not difficult to see that potential tension would arise in CEP 
events between VFs and LFs representing CEP that symbolised the West on 
one hand and local academics representing the local on the other. This local 
resistance certainly cast doubt on the impact of CEP on local academics. In 
other words, regardless of whether CEP was working for imperialism, some 
local academics might have already taken CEP as part of imperialistic 
invasion to the region.  
Organising a CEP event was not only expensive (around US$3000 for one 
event, which was about the same as a LF’s annual stipend), but also required 
a lot of time and effort on the part of LFs to co-ordinate and to administer 
them. What made it more complicated and time-consuming was LFs had to 
deal with departmental politics and local bureaucrats when LFs wanted to 
organise an event at their department. If CEP events could effectively spread 
ideologies that CEP wanted to promote and thus enable CEP to achieve its 
set goal, then it might still make sense for CEP to even overload LFs, who 
were already overwhelmed by teaching, with organising such events. 
However, given their cost and dubious quality and impact, together with 
potential local resistance, CEP still overloaded LFs with organising CEP 
events, when LFs as novel academics actually needed to make time and 
effort to equip themselves with their subject matters in order to become 
different local academics. What, then, kept CEP organising CEP events? This 
could be due to CEP’s passion for bringing changes to the region: organising 
some events was better than doing nothing at all, even at the expense of 
achieving their goal of nurturing LFs to become different local academics. 
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However, this could also be due to CEP’s strategic concern: in order to get 
further funding, CEP as an NGO had to have some activities, regardless of 
their effectiveness of achieving its ultimate goal, to report so as to impress its 
potential donors. In short, organising CEP events, out of passion or a 
strategic concern, contradicted its goal of running LFFP and/or led to its 
overall ineffectiveness. This meant that organising CEP events could turn its 
already ambiguous relationship with imperialism even more ambivalent.  
LFFs and VFFs 
As an ideal set by CEP, LFs as local experts and VFs as western experts 
complemented each other and worked side by side to spread the ideas of 
democracy, civil society, and critical thinking in the region. As CEP claimed, 
CEP would not become successful with only LFs without VFs or vice versa 
(Kotkin Report 2001: 142). In linking the West to the region, CEP was an 
interface between VFs from the West and LFs from the local. Against this 
context, the relationship between VFs and LFs was usually manifested in 
two manners. The first was a parallel to the patronising West and the 
differential local: differential LFs and patronising VFs. The second was an 
opposite of this parallel: defensive LFs and arrogant VFs. Contrary to the 
CEP ideal, from the start the context of CEP already gave rise to an in-built 
rift between LFs and VFs.  
This in-built rift, which could have been mended, was widened further by 
the fact that there was a huge discrepancy in packages offered to LFs and 
VFs. While both were CEP fellows, VFs were remunerated much more but 
worked much less than LFs. In addition to a number of allowances, the 
amount of an unattractive VFFP stipend was more than twice than that of an 
attractive LFFP stipend. However, an average teaching week was at most 
four hours for VFs but at least twenty hours for LFs. What complicated the 
situation was that in reality there were a diverse range of VFs and LFs that 
CEP recruited. To reiterate, by chance or luck, CEP might recruit some well-
established western academics and committed prospective local academics; 
in reality, the majority of VFs were not well-established academics and most 
LFs were only prospective professionals. This partly explained why many 
LFs and VFs did not take each other seriously. This attitude was reflected in 
the way in which they identified themselves and the other group as ‘them’ 
and ‘us’, ‘foreign’ and ‘local’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (and its implied ‘competent’ 
and incompetent’), as expressed in the following quotations.  
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‘We don’t need losers here; why do VFs come to the region if they 
have a well-paid prestigious job in the West?’ (from my 
interviews) 
 ‘Even if the foreigners are bad, it’s good (to have them) – they 
show us we’re not so bad.’ (quoted in Kotkin Report 2001:146) 
‘Those LFs have no ideas about teaching. What do they mean by 
“interactive teaching”? We are university professors and we are 
not teaching at school.’ (from my interviews) 
‘I have heard that their stipend is not attractive by western 
standards. But with that stipend, they could have a good local life 
here. And I don’t know what those foreigners are doing here – they 
just hang around and do nothing. In contrast, we LFs work so 
hard – teaching a lot and organising CEP events.’ (from my 
interviews) 
If CEP’s success, as CEP claimed, depended on the co-operation between 
VFs and LFs, then the rift between VFs and LFs exactly worked against it. 
On the one hand, the rift itself could be viewed as a product of global 
inequality or even a manifestation of imperialism: this context predisposed 
CEP to offer discriminative treatments between foreigners and locals. On the 
other hand, the rift could be seen as weakening CEP’s potential of achieving 
its set goal. What this implied was that the measure of indeterminacy 
regarding the relationship between CEP and imperialism was increased 
further. 
CEP and Fellows 
Regardless of the genuine intention behind CEP’s mission, CEP’s success 
was not simply contingent on whether CEP could make VFs and LFs fulfil 
what it had expected of them. Even if LFs and VFs actually did what CEP 
had expected of them, their outcomes and impacts would not necessarily be 
identical to what CEP had intended. Intention, action, outcome, and impact 
could somehow be viewed as rather independent of each other. Their 
relationships involve a substantial measure of indeterminacy. This measure 
of indeterminacy was widened further by the ways in which LFs and VFs 
took CEP. 
Based on their motivation behind why LFs and VFs joined CEP and the way 
in which they took CEP, I devised a typology of three categories of fellows. 
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The first was idealists: they joined CEP out of their passionate ideals and 
they took CEP as a channel to achieve these ideals. Using CEP resources 
and/or opportunities, local idealists genuinely wanted to bring some 
changes to their systems of higher education, not necessarily the way CEP 
wanted, while their visiting counterparts somehow wanted to realise their 
ideals in a new country. The second was opportunists: they joined CEP out 
of a strategic concern and they took CEP as one of many opportunities and 
resources for advancement. In addition to CEP stipend, they exploited other 
kinds of CEP resources only for their own personal gains. Some local 
opportunists kept books donated by CEP in a room that no students could 
access while others used CEP funding to organise pointless CEP events for 
local lecturers. What concerned them was neither whether any students 
could access the books, nor whether there was any point of running the CEP 
events, but the fact that they had access to external resources (books and 
funding). This gave them power or prestige in their departments, which they 
as junior faculty found particularly attractive with regard to securing a 
better position there. Similarly, their visiting counterparts used CEP 
resources to organise some so-called academic events for local lecturers, 
established an academic-like network with people from the region, and even 
assigned themselves to be editors of so-called academic journals that they set 
up. What concerned them was not the quality of these activities but their 
engagements in such activities. This made them look good on their 
curriculum vitae. The third category was pragmatists: they joined CEP out of 
an economic concern and they took CEP as an employer. Given economic 
hardship and the lack of job opportunities in the region, local pragmatists 
applied for a fellowship largely because of its relatively attractive stipend. 
Their visiting counterparts, despite an unattractive package, still joined CEP 
because of their inability to find a job in their home countries. The 
boundaries of these three groups were not clear-cut: we would never know 
whether a classification of fellows was accurate unless the fellows 
themselves were willing to state honestly their genuine motivations. 
Devising this typology, I did not mean to label or evaluate fellows as such; 
rather, I used it for the purpose of illustration in the following paragraph. 
At first glance, pragmatists and/or opportunists seemed to be better 
collaborators of western capitalists by comparison with idealists, because 
they were less likely than idealists to criticise neo-liberalism (and thus the 
ideas of free market and democracy). Alternatively, even if pragmatists and 
opportunists were critical about them, they were very unlikely to question 
the fundamental principles of the ideas. However, this did not lead us to the 
following view: what pragmatists and/or opportunists did was consistent 
with the development of imperialism whereas what idealists did 
contradicted it. This view is too simplistic to rule out the possibilities of 
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chance, contingency, or unintended consequences. For example, 
opportunists could be seen as the best collaborators of all of western 
capitalists because of their opportunistic nature. However, this very same 
opportunistic nature could also make them irrelevant to imperialism, 
contingent on the availability of other opportunities for their exploitation. 
Let me turn to the following two cases that were derived from my 
observation and experience of participating in some CEP events for further 
illustration. The first was that an opportunist used CEP funding to organise 
a conference on globalisation. Having a vague idea about globalisation, the 
opportunist did not care about the quality of the conference but just wanted 
to do something that would gain her prestige and power at the department. 
However, for some reasons, or simply by chance, this conference attracted 
some serious local academics to attend. Beyond the opportunist’s 
expectation, these serious academics examined the ideas of free market and 
globalisation rather critically. In this case, the genuine intention of the 
opportunist could be viewed as irrelevant to imperialism, what she did 
consistent with imperialism, what actually happened in this event 
contradictory to imperialism, and the impact of what happened on 
imperialism unknown. The second case was that an idealist used CEP 
funding to organise a series of seminars on human rights. The idealist did a 
lot of preparation for the seminars, including inviting important speakers 
from various related fields in the hope that local participants could examine 
the concept of human rights from different angles. However, in order to 
make this event happen at her department, she had to make compromises 
with the department head or the faculty dean, sparing some sessions for 
local authority figures to give ‘official’ speeches on some themes irrelevant 
to the seminars. Against the idealist’s wishes, participants did not have time 
for discussion on the concept of human rights, let alone examining it 
critically, but they vaguely got the conclusion that free market and 
democracy were the preconditions of securing human rights. In this case, the 
genuine intention of the idealist could be viewed as a challenge or resistance 
to imperialism, what she did irrelevant to imperialism, what actually 
happened in the event giving a boost to imperialism, and the impact of what 
happened on imperialism indeterminate. What this indicates is this: even if a 
logic of imperialism exists, it is not necessary internally consistent that offers 
us a definite complete version of scenarios of the future but it could involve 
a great measure of contingency and indeterminacy. In sum, whether CEP 
was a catalyst or a gravedigger of imperialism to some extent was 
contingent on impacts of outcomes, by plan or by chance, intentional or 
unintentional, anticipated or unexpected, resulting from endless battles 
among CEP, pragmatists, opportunists, and idealists. This view echoes 
Ruccio’s (2003) notion of an imperial-machine:  
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‘Imperialism (…) is a multidimensional set of practices (economic, 
political, and cultural) with no necessary unity or inevitability 
about them. They may and often do work together, but with no 
singular purpose or organising entity. And just as they are set in 
motion, they can be resisted, deflected, and even stopped. (…) 
Imperialism (…) is partial and incomplete, a project that is both 
powerful and fragile, less a description of an entire stage of 
capitalist or world development than a project in that world, an 
attempt to make and remake that world.’ (2003: 86; cf. Rossi 2005)  
Conclusion  
Using CEP as an example, I seek to challenge the assumption about the 
relationship between NGOs and the development of imperialism; in 
particular, I do it by highlighting the elements of contradiction, contingency, 
and indeterminacy that have been overlooked in that assumption. While 
many scholars assume that the relationship between NGOs and imperialism 
is simple and direct in that NGOs play a definite role, be it enabling or 
constraining, in the development of imperialism, I demonstrate that the 
relationship between CEP and imperialism is neither simple nor direct in 
that CEP practices could be consistent with, contradictory to, or simply 
irrelevant to imperialism. Whereas some scholars seem to imply that the 
development of imperialism follows a logic that is complete and powerful 
and involves a definite irresistible outcome, I doubt whether such a logic 
really exists and argue that this logic of imperialism, even if it exists at all, 
could be both complete and partial and both powerful and fragile in that the 
development of imperialism involves a measure of contingency or 
indeterminacy open to infinite possible reactions and re-reactions. In this 
sense, if a logic of imperialism does exist, my challenge can be seen as 
providing both a more optimistic and more pessimistic prognosis of the 
future (cf. Negri 2005). It is more optimistic in that the development of 
imperialism is not so deterministic but involves a measure of contingency or 
indeterminacy, meaning that we may still have room to manoeuvre. It is 
more pessimistic in that this measure of contingency or indeterminacy is 
already prescribed as part of the logic, implying that its development is 
beyond our control and thus room for manoeuvre is perhaps much more 
limited than what we would like to believe. 
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